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Introduction
In 2007 Luxembourg had the highest GDP
per capita in the world at $80,800 per person.
(CIA) The financial services industry, which
includes banks, investment services, advisory
services, and holding companies, accounts for
nearly one quarter of Luxembourg’s GDP. The
most important factor in the industry’s con-
tinued growth has been the country’s “nim-
ble” tax and regulatory frameworks.1 Over the
last forty years, financial services in Luxem-
bourg have grown from a minor sector to the
largest sector of the nation’s economy. Fol-
lowing the initial growth in the 1970s, attribut-
able to the decline in the steel industry and
the tax and regulatory policies of neighboring
states, the nimble tax and regulatory policies
of Luxembourg have provided a strong foun-
dation for the sector’s growth and international
competitiveness. 
This article will analyze the financial serv-
ices industry in Luxembourg in relation to its
tax and regulatory policies. The first section
examines the ways in which the decline of steel,
coupled with Luxembourg’s location, languages
and stable political environment, led to the
growth and prominence of financial services
in the economy. The following section assesses
the ways in which the tax and regulatory poli-
cies are nimble and aid the financial services
industry’s continued success, and offers three
specific examples of Luxembourg’s nimble
response to challenges in tax and regulatory
policies. The final section examines the impli-
cations of Luxembourg’s tax and regulatory poli-
cies for other economies, showing that the poli-
cies have the ability to positively impact
surrounding nations. 
From Steel-Based Economy to
Financial Services
The financial services industry in Lux-
embourg is relatively young, as steel dominated
the nation’s economic landscape for much of the
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LUXEMBOURG’S FINANCIAL SERVICES
SECTOR AS A PRODUCT OF NIMBLE
TAX AND REGULATORY POLICY
Bridget Clancy
1Luxembourg’s tax and regulatory policies are “nim-
ble” in that they adapt to changing conditions very quickly,
capitalizing on opportunities and turning rulings, events,
and new financial services products to their favor. 
last 100 years. After the Second World War,
the steel industry continued to grow due to
the need for reconstruction and brought about
high growth rates for the Luxembourg economy
as a whole. Rapid growth led Luxembourgers to
coin the period from 1945–1975 as the “thirty
glorious years.” In fact, growth rates for GDP
were more than 3.9 percent for each decade in
this period. (STATEC) Despite steel’s importance
in the history and development of Luxembourg’s
economy, however, the industry eventually came
under intense pressure due to greater compe-
tition from new steel producing centers. Follow-
ing the first oil crisis in the mid-1970s, the Lux-
embourg steel industry experienced a crisis of
its own; worldwide overcapacity contributed
to declining prices and grim prospects for future
profitability. By 1981 the last iron mine in
Luxembourg closed, and steel production was
greatly reduced. (STATEC) 
Ironically, the decline of the steel industry
provided the perfect opportunity for the emer-
gence of a new dominant industry — financial
services. With a gaping hole in its national econ-
omy, Luxembourg required new sources of
employment and economic activity. Since the
1970s, the composition of the Luxembourg
economy has shifted dramatically toward finan-
cial service activities, as shown in Figure 1.
From 1970 to 2001, the steel industry’s share of
the value added to GDP plummeted from 28 per-
cent to 2 percent. At the same time, the finan-
cial services’ share of the value added to GDP
expanded from 4.6 percent to nearly 25 percent.
(STATEC)
Figure 1 shows that the financial serv-
ices industry became the dominant contributor
to GDP by 1980, quickly dwarfing all other
industries. This industry is not only important
in terms of the dollars generated by the indus-
try, but also for employment. In 2006 the finan-
cial services industry accounted for 40 percent
of the Luxembourg workforce, both directly and
indirectly. (“Luxembourg”) However the impact
on the nation is measured, financial services
is clearly the leading sector in Luxembourg’s
economy. 
How did financial services grow at such a
rapid rate? And why did Luxembourg choose
financial services to replace its steel industry?
Three sets of factors explain Luxembourg’s
rise as a financial services center. First, Lux-
embourg is a multilingual, centrally located, and
geographically small nation. Second, changes
in the tax and regulatory policies of nearby
nations encouraged financial services and cap-
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Figure 1
Luxembourg GDP by Industry: 1970–2000
Source: OECD National Accounts: Statistics Portal.
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ital from investors to move to Luxembourg.
Third, Luxembourg’s nimble tax and regulatory
systems provide a favorable environment for the
financial services economy in response to
changes in international financial markets
and policy. These systems also enable Luxem-
bourg to corner niche markets in financial serv-
ices — such as international pension funds and
mutual funds. However, this success has not
always come without criticism from other enti-
ties, such as Germany, the OECD, and the EU.
In fact, Luxembourg is often referred to as a “tax
haven,” and competitors claim that its policies
distort the European market or unfairly erode
the tax base of other European nations. 
Sources of Strength in the Financial
Services Sector
National Characteristics
Luxembourg is located in the heart of
Western Europe, bordered by France, Germany,
and Belgium. Since Luxembourg is a member
of the European Union, people within the EU
can travel freely through Luxembourg to other
member states. In addition, Luxembourg is a
short flight from most major European cities.
Its location has also been crucial in attracting
talent and expertise from neighboring nations,
such as Belgium and Germany. Due to Lux-
embourg’s small size, foreign workers often can
choose either to relocate to Luxembourg as res-
idents or commute across the border. In fact,
foreigners comprise 40 percent of Luxembourg’s
population and 50 percent of the total Luxem-
bourg workforce today. (Luxembourg for
Finance) 
Another major factor in Luxembourg’s
regional and international appeal is its pop-
ulation’s strong command of languages. 
Luxembourg has three officially recognized lan-
guages. Luxembourg schools conduct preschool
in Luxembourgish, primary school mostly in
German, and middle school and high school pri-
marily in French. For those who enter the
general secondary track, the normal curriculum
for college-bound students, English is a required
course of study. (SIP) Thus, Luxembourgers
graduating from general secondary schools have
a strong command of at least four languages.
This means that neighboring nations can gen-
erally do business in Luxembourg in their native
language, thereby removing a major obstacle in
multinational business. Luxembourg also pres-
ents a stable political environment, which is
reassuring to financial services firms. With a sin-
gle political party holding the majority of seats
in Luxembourg’s Parliament over most of the
past fifty years, policies and strategies have
not changed drastically, and this continuity
reduces the risks of doing business in Luxem-
bourg. (U.S. Department of State) At the time
of the steel industry’s major downturn, Luxem-
bourg’s three major advantages of a prime loca-
tion, a multilingual population, and a stable
political environment all contributed to its
attractiveness for financial services. 
Tax and Regulatory Policies of
Other Nations
Today, these three advantages mentioned
above continue to be touted prominently in
investment brochures for Luxembourg. How-
ever, it is still unclear why the financial services
industry in particular rose to prominence fol-
lowing the decline of steel, as the above advan-
tages could also have aided a number of other
industries serving multinational corporations
and foreigners. Luxembourg’s growth as a finan-
cial center did not accelerate until the 1960s and
1970s, as financial service firms and activities
needed an additional impetus to bring them
to Luxembourg. As conditions in other nations
became less favorable to financial services,
bankers, individuals, and businesses turned to
Luxembourg as a convenient alternative; and
after the decline of steel, certain changes in
the tax and regulatory policies of nearby nations
also drove this growth. 
Banking is a prime example. The num-
ber of foreign banks in Luxembourg rose in
response to certain policy changes in those
nations, creating several “waves” of growth in
foreign banks which are discussed below. The
growth in the total number of banks, along with
the primary nation(s) associated with each wave
of growth, are shown in Figure 2. (STATEC) For
example, in the 1960s, German banks set up
affiliates in Luxembourg, due in part to rising
interest rates and reserve rates in Germany.
(IMF, 2002) The 1970s saw an influx of banks
from the U.S. and Switzerland. Swiss banks
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entered for the liquidity of the euromarket
and to establish relations with the German
banks in Luxembourg, while American banks
came mainly for private banking. Scandina-
vian banks began to enter at the end of the
1970s in order to gain access to lending in
foreign currencies. In the 1980s private bank-
ing and asset management grew considerably,
helped by Luxembourg’s introduction of a more
comprehensive banking secrecy law. Finally,
in the 1990s large amounts of German capital
came into Luxembourg when Germany intro-
duced considerably higher taxes on interest
from savings in 1992. Foreign banks continue
to comprise a large part of the financial services
activity in Luxembourg, with 130 of the total
155 banks registered in Luxembourg as of
March 2006 being foreign. (ABBL) 
The relationship between financial service
sector growth and the tax and regulatory poli-
cies of other nations is not restricted to banks.
The eurobond and eurodollar markets both
emerged in Luxembourg due to restrictive
measures in the U.S. In the 1950s and 1960s,
Europe and much of the rest of the world had
higher interest rates than the U.S., making
foreign bonds with higher interest rates attrac-
tive to U.S. investors. In response, many foreign
bonds were issued in the U.S. during this time
period. In an effort to reduce the exodus of
U.S. funds to other nations, in 1963 the United
States introduced an interest equalization tax of
15 percent on the interest from foreign bonds.
The introduction of this tax led to the growth of
the eurobond market. Eurobonds are bonds that
are denominated in a currency different from
the domestic currency in the nation of issue.
Since the 1960s, these markets have grown
tremendously; in 2005 the Luxembourg Stock
Exchange listed 59 percent of the interna-
tional bonds in Europe. (ABBL) Issuers in
Luxembourg include the European Invest-
ment Bank, the European Commission, and the
World Bank. Thus, the eurobond market in Lux-
embourg grew as a result of the introduction
of a new tax in the United States. 
Regulatory changes in other nations also
spawned much of the demand for financial serv-
ices in Luxembourg. However, many neigh-
boring nations felt pressure to maintain attrac-
tive business practices after seeing their talent,
business, and potential tax revenue relocate to
Luxembourg. Thus Luxembourg could not
rely solely on the restrictive regulations of other
nations to sustain the growth and success of
its financial services industry. Other nations can
see the effects of their policies and respond
accordingly. 
A Nimble Luxembourg Government
Instead of waiting to capitalize on poli-
cies of other nations that are unfavorable for
financial services, Luxembourg’s government
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Figure 2
Change in the Number of Banks in Luxembourg: 1960–2002
Source: CSSF (Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier).
has become proactive in fueling the growth and
prominence of financial services through its
own tax and regulatory policies. Today, this is
perhaps the most important competitive advan-
tage for financial services. With the financial
services industry comprising a large proportion
of GDP, contributing greatly to the national
budget through the tax revenues it produces, as
well as serving as an important source of
employment within Luxembourg, there is great
incentive for the government to cater to the
needs of the industry. Luxembourg’s policies
have been extremely responsive to the interests
of the financial services industry, responding to
both opportunities and threats in ways that pro-
vide advantages to the industry. 
For example, Luxembourg has established
niche financial services markets that are highly
competitive and very profitable. Over the years,
entities such as the OECD, the European Com-
mission, and foreign nations have pressured
Luxembourg to make changes to its tax and reg-
ulatory policies, as the examples below will illus-
trate. Luxembourg has responded to these pres-
sures by fighting to maintain its “pillars” of
business, such as banking secrecy, and modi-
fying its policies to accept new regulations, such
as SPFs.2 In addition to protecting the current
strengths of the financial service industry,
Luxembourg has proven itself to be an early
adopter of new opportunities in the industry.
For instance, in 1985 the European Economic
Committee established a regulatory frame-
work for undertakings in collective invest-
ment in transferable securities (UCITS), oth-
erwise known as open-end investment funds,
which allowed funds to be registered in a sin-
gle nation and subsequently brought to other
member states without having to re-register.
(Patnaik) In 1988 Luxembourg became the first
member state to turn this framework into
national law, thereby becoming a top location
for investment and mutual funds. Incidentally,
in 1995 Luxembourg hosted 23.2 percent of the
European UCITS, ahead of France and Germany.
Furthermore, the net assets of Luxembourg’s
UCITS in 2005 amounted to more than 1.5
trillion euros. (ABBL) This is just one of many
examples of Luxembourg’s work to provide
favorable tax and regulatory policies for its
financial services industry. 
Luxembourg’s Response to Threats
to the Financial Services Industry
Banking Secrecy
Banking secrecy became an important fea-
ture of financial services in many European
nations following the Second World War. Many
nations consider banking secrecy to be a neces-
sary extension of the protection of an individ-
ual’s right to privacy. (Giovannini et al.) In Lux-
embourg, banking secrecy has been a tradition
for some time, but was first written into law
in 1981, following the first waves of foreign
banks coming to Luxembourg. Luxembourg’s
laws on banking secrecy prohibit banks from
disclosing information about their customers to
a third party. Luxembourg’s laws regarding
banking secrecy are among the most protective
in the world. For example, in Luxembourg (as
well as in Switzerland) a breach of banking con-
fidentiality is a criminal offense punishable by
jail time, whereas in most other nations the
offense is a civil offense subject only to fines.
(Giovannini et al.)
Although Luxembourg provides much
protection for depositors, the protection does
not extend to criminal acts. Banking secrecy
cannot be claimed in order to protect a cus-
tomer in a criminal matter. Therefore, in the
case of a criminal or judicial investigation, banks
can be ordered to cooperate fully with the inves-
tigation if the offense is considered a crime in
Luxembourg as well as in the foreign nation.
While this policy is highly effective and has been
praised for its use in such crimes as money laun-
dering, there is a large legal grey area regarding
tax evasion. Indeed, both Luxembourg and
Switzerland make a distinction between tax 
evasion and tax fraud, and only the latter is 
considered a criminal offense. As a result, it is 
difficult for foreign governments to prove sus-
pected tax fraud, and not simply evasion, in
order to gain access to account information in
Luxembourg.
Many challenges to banking secrecy have
emerged over the years. In 1998 the OECD
issued the Harmful Tax Competition report,
which outlined general tax practices that were
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2As will be discussed later, SPFs are a specific type
of holding company which Luxembourg introduced in 1997.
believed to distort the natural flow of trade
and investment as well as erode national tax
bases. The OECD identified the lack of
“exchange of information” as a major contribu-
tor to harmful tax practices. (OECD. “Harmful
Tax Competition”) While the initial efforts of the
Harmful Tax Competition report were to estab-
lish a framework to identify and combat harm-
ful tax practices in non-OECD nations, it has
since also taken a closer look at potentially
harmful practices within the OECD. 
Recently, the EU proposed a directive
which included a provision requiring all mem-
ber states to participate in the exchange of infor-
mation on savings held by non-residents begin-
ning July 1, 2005. This directive would have
required Luxembourg to give foreign govern-
ments access to the names of non-residents and
the corresponding amounts of investments in
Luxembourg. (“Taxation: Commission Wel-
comes . . .”) Luxembourg, along with Belgium,
and Austria, fought against the exchange of
information mandated by the proposed EU
Directive. These three nations argued that as
soon as the proposed directive would go into
effect, there would be an exodus of funds to
nearby non-EU nations, specifically several prin-
cipalities of other EU nations, such as the Isle
of Man and Jersey, as well as other nations such
as Switzerland. Luxembourg argued that it
was disingenuous for EU states to enforce direc-
tives on other member states while tolerating
the banned practices in their own dependent
principalities. Furthermore, as funds can eas-
ily be relocated from EU to non-EU nations,
eliminating banking secrecy within the EU
might harm Luxembourg and other EU nations
while not achieving any great reductions in
tax evasion or higher tax revenues for EU
nations. 
In the end, Luxembourg, Belgium, and
Austria were successful in placing a special
clause in the directive stating that the three
nations would not be required to exchange
information until other neighboring countries
and countries associated with member states
also removed banking secrecy laws. These
neighboring and associated countries include
Monaco, Switzerland, Andorra, Jersey, and the
Isle of Man. (“Taxation: Commission Welcomes
. . .”) Because these named nations show no cur-
rent intentions of eliminating their banking
secrecy laws, banking secrecy therefore appears
to be secure in Luxembourg for the near future. 
Withholding Taxes on Savings and
Dividends
Luxembourg’s success in maintaining
banking secrecy opened the door for another
long-running area of contention among EU
nations — withholding taxes. To provide some
background, Luxembourg historically has left
the responsibility to pay taxes with its bank
depositors. However, some other European
countries assist foreign tax collection by with-
holding a certain amount of non-residents’
interest income and dividends and then trans-
ferring this amount to the non-residents’ home
nations for tax collection. 
For years some nations such as Germany
have insisted that Luxembourg impose with-
holding taxes on such unearned income. For
example, Germany’s increase in its tax on resi-
dent unearned income and tighter enforcement
of the same tax in 1993 led German depositors
to flee to Luxembourg and other nearby nations.
According to Nathaniel Nash, the Frankfurt
bureau chief of The New York Times, it is esti-
mated that Germans deposited $150 billion in
Luxembourg bank accounts, with large amounts
coming from both middle and lower class Ger-
man workers. (Nash) Stories emerged of Ger-
mans packing the highways into Luxembourg,
with suitcases of money in the trunks. As Nash
continues, “During the last two years
[1992–1993], German government officials esti-
mate that they have lost $15 billion in tax rev-
enues.” This flight of capital and loss of poten-
tial tax revenue from Germany caused Germany
to place pressure on Luxembourg to impose a
withholding tax. Luxembourg opposed the
introduction of a withholding tax, claiming that
there were other nations such as the U.K. that
did not impose such withholding taxes and that
these nations would be the next target for Ger-
man depositors. Also, Luxembourg claimed that
it had depositors from many other nations
besides Germany. In the end, no such tax was
introduced in Luxembourg, and Germany sub-
sequently reduced its own tax on unearned
income. 
Later, the EU, the OECD, and the Euro-
pean Commission all sought to introduce broad
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withholding taxes in all member states, citing
the strong incentive for tax evasion in their
absence. In exchange for maintaining banking
secrecy in the proposed EU directive discussed
earlier, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Austria
agreed to impose withholding taxes on non-res-
ident savings, taxes that would rise from 15 per-
cent in 2005 to 35 percent in 2009. Three-quar-
ters of the withholding taxes collected would be
transferred to the home countries of non-resi-
dent depositors, while the remaining 25 percent
of the money withheld would stay in Luxem-
bourg. However, the names or amounts of
depositors would not be transferred back to
the home countries of non-residents with the
withholding revenue. (“Taxation: Commission
Welcomes . . .”) Thus, it appeared that Luxem-
bourg would have to sacrifice some but not all
of its advantages in providing financial services. 
As has come to be expected of Luxembourg,
though, government officials began to work
immediately to put new favorable tax policies
into place. One way to avoid the high with-
holding tax rates is Luxembourg’s network of
double-tax treaties with trading partner nations.
Following the directive, Luxembourg began to
work on this network of treaties, updating
older treaties with nations such as the U.S. as
well as forming new treaties with such nations
as Malta and Estonia. Many of these treaties
follow the OECD model and have 5–15 percent
tax rates on dividends, 10 percent on interest,
and 5–10 percent on royalties. The above rates
in the treaties are much lower than those spec-
ified in the directive (15 to 35 percent), and thus
greatly reduce the taxes on foreign depositors in
Luxembourg. By negotiating double-tax treaties,
Luxembourg can match low withholding tax
rates of many nations competing for financial
services clients; and current banking customers
thus have little incentive to flee Luxembourg.
Luxembourg also continues to aggressively
expand its double-tax treaty network. As of
June 2007, Luxembourg had double-tax treaties
with 51 countries, with 13 more under discus-
sion. (“Luxembourg Tax Treaty . . .”) Thus, while
Luxembourg has had to make concessions in
order to maintain banking secrecy, it has still
been able to preserve low withholding tax rates
in order to keep its financial services industry
competitive with other nations.
Holding Companies
Luxembourg has a large number of foreign
businesses that have established their headquar-
ters in Luxembourg through the use of holding
companies. There are many different acts reg-
ulating holding companies, and firms may
choose among these when deciding to incor-
porate in Luxembourg. An important 1929
law allowing holding companies in Luxem-
bourg, called the Holdings 1929 legislation, was
enacted to allow special investment vehicles
which attracted multinational corporations,
mostly financial companies, to establish their
headquarters in Luxembourg. (“State Aid: Com-
mission Opens Formal . . .”) By 1933 the num-
ber of companies under the legislation had
grown to 360, while their number in 2006 was
estimated to be more than 10,000. (Pesch) For
a time, companies achieving this status enjoyed
substantial tax benefits, as qualifying companies
were exempt from Luxembourg taxes on earn-
ings, dividends, and royalties. 
The Holdings 1929 legislation created
some resentment among neighboring nations,
as more and more companies looked to Lux-
embourg for its favorable tax environment. By
1997 the European Commission had begun
working on a package of several measures to
eliminate “harmful tax competition.” (“Taxation
. . .”) In 1999 the Code of Conduct group of
the European Commission issued a report out-
lining 66 harmful tax practices within the EU
and neighboring states, one of which was the
Holdings 1929 legislation. (“Code of Conduct 
. . .”) The report claimed that many holding com-
panies are established entirely or in part due to
tax planning purposes, and therefore have lit-
tle real business activity or purpose other than
to hold earnings or transfer and distribute them
among related businesses. (“Code of Conduct 
. . . ,” p. 16) 
In 2006 the European Commission (EC)
first ruled the 1929 legislation constituted
illegal state aid and demanded its repeal. Lux-
embourg had been aware of the threats to its
Holdings 1929 legislation for some time, as
the legislation was singled out in the 1999 Code
of Conduct report. In fact, Luxembourg
attempted to modify the legislation in order to
avoid repealing the law in June 2005, limiting
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the scope of the 1929 legislation to corporations
that were taxed on an effective basis of at least
11 percent through the taxes imposed on the
dividends of non-resident companies associated
with the holding company. (Fort and Lesage)
Despite the modifications to appease the Euro-
pean Commission, Luxembourg’s law was still
found to be in violation of the Code of Conduct.
The EC reasoned that the legislation provided
unjustified tax advantages and encouraged com-
panies to create structures in Luxembourg to
avoid taxes in their home nation. (“State Aid:
Commission Demands . . .”) According to a vade
mecum3 issued by the EU regarding state aid,
state aid is illegal when all of the following
criteria are met: (1) there is a transfer of state
resources (2) to create an economic advantage
(3) which is selective and (4) which has a poten-
tial effect on trade and competition within the
EU. (“State Aid,” 2007) The legislation cannot
exclude or specifically include certain sectors of
the economy to receive the benefits and bypass
the selectivity criteria for state aid. The 1929
Holdings legislation targeted financial serv-
ices firms and was found to constitute state
aid because it offered tax advantages only to this
sector. 
When the EC ruling against the 1929
Holdings legislation was announced in July
2006, Luxembourg decided against appealing
the decision. Therefore, after 2010 former 1929
Holdings companies will cease to enjoy the
tax benefits of the status. This generously 
long transition period was a major factor in 
Luxembourg’s decision not to appeal the deci-
sion. In Luxembourg, there are already many
other attractive alternatives for holding compa-
nies and investment vehicles. In fact, according
to Keith O’Donnell, a tax advisor, the 1929 
Holdings legislation had already lost much 
of its appeal for potential holding companies
in light of other alternatives in Luxembourg.
(O’Donnell) 
As the 1929 legislation had been singled
out by the OECD and the EC for more than 
a decade prior to the negative ruling, Luxem-
bourg had already been working to provide an
alternative vehicle for new holding compa-
nies. In 1997 Luxembourg introduced the Fam-
ily Private Assets Group Management legisla-
tion, which allows the formation of Family
Private Assets Management Companies, which
are more commonly referred to as SPFs
(Sociétés de Gestion du Patrimoine Familial).
According to O’Donnell, this legislation pri-
marily targets private wealth management, with
SPFs having as their functions “the acquisition,
holding, management and disposal of finan-
cial assets excluding any type of commercial
activity.” (O’Donnell) By specifically excluding
commercial activity, the new legislation cannot
be found to constitute state aid, which applies
to aiding entities involved in economic activ-
ity. The tax benefits of SPFs include exemp-
tion from the corporate income tax, the net-
worth tax, and the municipal business tax.
Distributions from SPFs to their investors will
be subject to individual taxes, while non-resi-
dents will be exempt from taxes on gains on the
investments. (O’Donnell) Thus, new holding
companies can be established under this frame-
work, and existing 1929 Holdings companies
can re-establish themselves as SPFs by the
end of the 2010 grace period. Luxembourg
was able to find an alternative means to the
same end as the Holdings 1929 legislation
that was within the terms of the EU’s Code of
Conduct.
Implications of Luxembourg’s 
Tax and Regulatory Policies 
Luxembourg’s responsive regulatory sys-
tem has allowed its financial services industry
to thrive despite challenges and has opened
the industry to pioneering new niche activi-
ties such as mutual funds and open-end invest-
ment funds. The larger looming question is
the effect of the financial service industry’s suc-
cess on the greater international economy. Lux-
embourg’s nimble tax and regulatory policies
have helped the financial services industry
account for approximately 25 percent of its GDP,
provide jobs to a large portion of the population,
inflate the demand for complementary indus-
tries such as hospitality, and contribute to the
world’s highest GDP per capita. Also, because of
Luxembourg’s small size, even the low tax rates
on financial services provide large contributions
to the national budget and allow Luxembourg
to provide a high level of public services to its
residents.
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3Manual or handbook.
However, this happy state of affairs is not
popular with Luxembourg’s neighbors, the
EU, or the OECD. They often accuse Luxem-
bourg of distorting the capital market of the EU
and eroding the tax revenues of other nations.
In the case of financial services, a victory for
Luxembourg often entails a loss for other
nations, literally. As mentioned earlier, the Ger-
man government estimated its loss of poten-
tial tax revenues at $15 billion following the
increase in savings taxes in 1992–93. (Nash)
In this case, the flight of capital to Luxembourg
was due to public sentiment that the high
taxes on savings were unfair and unjustified.
(Nash) As The Economist notes, “If an individ-
ual feels his tax burden is unfair, he can vote for
tax-cutting politicians or go to live in a less
heavily taxed country — or, if he does not
mind breaking the law, he can hide his money
abroad.” (“All Together Now”) While the third
option is illegal, the fact that so many German
citizens pursued this route can also send a clear
message to German lawmakers. Consequently,
tax competition may be able to discipline gov-
ernments when domestic politics fail to do so.
Tax competition is not inherently bad, and
small nations providing low tax rates and
engaging in tax competition are not necessar-
ily stealing tax revenues and public services
from other nations. Frits Bolkestein, a member
of the European Commission responsible for
Internal Market, Taxation and Customs Union
issues, noted in an address to the European
American Business Council that tax competi-
tion can, in fact, be healthy and can induce gov-
ernments to offer high quality public services
more efficiently (i.e. at a lower cost to taxpay-
ers) by encouraging lower tax rates among
competing nations. Indeed, tax competition
may be one of the more effective forms of
controlling wasteful government spending.
(Bolkestein) Tax competition only becomes
harmful when it precludes nations from provid-
ing the basic public services to its residents, not
simply when a nation can quantify a loss of
tax revenues. Thus, Luxembourg can play a pos-
itive role in improving the efficiency of the
EU economy while enjoying success in its
own financial services. 
The OECD and the European Commission
have chosen to introduce broad measures to
reduce harmful tax practices to eliminate dis-
tortions in the capital market of the EU. The
result of their efforts have been several reports
and directives already mentioned, including the
OECD’s Harmful Tax Competition report and
the EU’s directive on the taxation of savings.
These measures have met with some success.
The OECD found 47 tax practices within OECD
nations to be harmful in a report from 2000.
In a follow-up report in 2004, nearly 40 percent
of these practices had been abolished, 30 per-
cent had been amended, and another 30 percent
had been re-evaluated and deemed not to be
harmful. However, despite the appearance of
success suggested by figures such as the ones
above, oftentimes the reports and directives
become watered down, as in the case of banking
secrecy and Luxembourg, Belgium, and Austria.
In fact, even the OECD’s progress report shows
evidence of this, as nearly 30 percent of the prac-
tices that are no longer listed as harmful have
not been changed or amended, but were instead
“re-evaluated” and found not be harmful after
discussion with the nations. In another exam-
ple, in the directive imposing withholding taxes,
the U.K. was able to narrow the definition of
“savings” to shield eurobonds from the tax, aid-
ing its own eurobond market and Luxembourg’s
as well. Examples such as these indicate that
some of the successes of the OECD and the
EU have been somewhat limited. 
In looking at the greater effect of these
reform measures on the global economy, many
recognize that the EU has consistently had
higher taxes than many other regions of the
world, affecting its ability to compete in today’s
globalized market. Some initiatives proposed by
the EU would improve the internal financial
market of the EU, but might, in the end, con-
tribute to the EU simply losing business and 
tax revenues to other regions of the world (as in
the case of banking secrecy). In this instance,
Luxembourg’s actions to protect its own inter-
ests may benefit the ability of the whole EU to
compete.
While the OECD has been critical of some
of Luxembourg’s tax and regulatory policies,
the OECD has been criticized for catering to
the interests of high-tax nations, and is some-
times facetiously referred to as a rich nation’s
club. (Mitchell) However, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) often takes a slightly dif-
ferent approach to identifying harmful prac-
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tices in financial services in offshore finan-
cial centers4 (OFCs) such as Luxembourg, by
focusing on the risks that OFC pose to the sta-
bility of financial markets. The results of IMF
studies reveal that, on average, high-wealth off-
shore financial center nations have more and
better regulations in place than those of non-
OFC developed nations. The IMF studies also
show that it is the low-wealth OFCs, such as
Tunisia, which generate the most concern over
criminal activity. (IMF, 2003) Luxembourg was
reviewed by the IMF in 2001, and was found to
need only minor improvements in the regu-
lation and oversight of its financial service
activities, many of which have since been
corrected. (IMF, 2004) Therefore, when Lux-
embourg’s tax and regulatory policies are eval-
uated by the risks that they pose to the inter-
national economy rather than by the
immediate monetary losses to neighboring
nations that they may cause, Luxembourg’s
policies do not appear to pose a major threat
to the stability of economies.
Conclusion
While Luxembourg is often referred to as
a “tax haven” with its negative connotations,
many overlook Luxembourg’s important role in
the regional and international economy, a role
that has developed over a relatively short period
of time. Luxembourg has now established
expertise in specialized financial services, while
its nimble tax and regulatory framework ensures
that Luxembourg continues to reap the benefits
of its past successes in financial services.
With its considerable competitive advan-
tages, Luxembourg should continue to offer cre-
ative products which provide desired services for
financial services clients. However, Luxembourg
must also continue to improve its methods of
tax competition, ensuring that its success is
derived from legitimate business activity and
from honest depositors. This must be done even
if it means slowly curbing the more question-
able options available, such as Luxembourg’s
somewhat contrived distinction between tax
evasion and tax fraud mentioned earlier which
contributes to a possible abuse of banking
secrecy. These measures will allow Luxembourg
to reaffirm that it is among the most secure,
reputable places in the world to conduct finan-
cial business, and will provide for the success of
its financial services in the decades to follow.
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4While there is not a singular agreed-upon definition
for an “offshore financial center,” the requirements are
not related to the proximity of a nation to water. Instead,
OFCs are characterized by financial institutions with a
majority of business conducted with non-residents, or a
large amount of non-resident assets and liabilities, and those
nations with low tax rates and banking secrecy.
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